Security Assessment of Hromadas. 2 wave

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What is a security audit?

A security audit is a universal tool for monitoring institutional capacity that ensures a transparent decision-making framework on whether elections can or cannot be held in specific territories. This framework is accessible to society, the state, and Ukraine’s Western partners alike. The audit covers the following areas: basic preconditions, physical security, socio-economic factors, and the state of democratic processes.

The audit allows analysing:

🛡️Readiness to respond to security challenges: The level of the security situation in a hromada and the ability of local authorities to effectively respond to potential threats.
📊Dynamics of socio-economic processes: Whether residents of a hromada have access to services that ensure basic social and economic conditions (healthcare, financial and postal services, etc.).
🗳️Feasibility of implementing electoral procedures: An audit of the conditions for holding free and fair elections and the availability of organisational capacity to administer the electoral process.

Stages and Conditions of the Audit

Stage	Sphere	Type of criteria	Number of indicators	Passing conditions
➊	🎯 Prerequisites for starting an auditу	🔑 Top priority criteria	3	All "yes"
➋	🛡️ Security	📌 Mandatory	6	≥0.5 for each
➋	🛡️ Security	📎 Optional	2	≥0,5 із 2
➌	💼 Social and economic	📌 Mandatory	9	≥0.5 for each
➌	💼 Social and economic	📎 Optional	5	≥2 із 5
➍	🗳️ Democracy	📌 Mandatory	5	≥0.5 for each
➍	🗳️ Democracy	📎 Optional	5	≥2 із 5

Conditions for passing the audit

Each stage is assessed with 1 point (passed) or 0 points (not passed).
Only hromadas that score 4 out of 4 points are considered to have passed the audit and to be ready for elections.

A lower score means that the audit has not been passed; however, the assessment allows for the identification of problem areas requiring further improvement.

The full methodology for conducting the audit is available on the website of the Civil Network OPORA.

Conducted audits

➊ wave
🗓️ March-April 2025
📍 Zaporizhzhia, Kryvyi Rih, Poltava, and Snihurivka hromadas
🔍 The results of the first monitoring can be viewed here.

➋ wave
🗓️ October-November 2025
📍 Velyka Pysarivka, Izium, Kramatorsk, Kremenchuk, Nikopol, Novomykolaivka, Olevsk, Pervomaisk, Pivdenne, Snovsk, and Kherson hromadas
🔍 This dashboard presents brief results and conclusions of OPORA experts’ work. The full report is available here.

Assessed hromadas

Priority Steps

Priority Steps for Restoring Democratic Processes in Communities Based on the Results of Two Audit Waves

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A security audit should become a mandatory tool for assessing the readiness of physical and social infrastructure in de-occupied hromadas and hromadas located in zones of active hostilities. These hromadas recorded the lowest assessment scores. At the same time, there is no direct correlation between security risks and physical distance (50 or 100 km) to the active combat line. Instead, the systematic implementation of such assessments may encourage capital investment in restoring critical infrastructure even before political reactivation takes place.
There is a need to develop a legislative framework to define territories where holding safe and democratic elections is not possible. Any decisions affecting constitutional rights must be justified by verified data. This requires abandoning a formalistic approach (such as defining a conditional 50 or 100 kilometre zone where electoral security is allegedly impossible). Security levels are determined by a combination of factors, including the intensity of hostilities, the state of infrastructure, the availability of shelters, and the capacity to respond to critical situations affecting citizens’ lives and the provision of basic services. Implementing such an approach would help create the conditions for well-reasoned decision-making.
The scale of the assessments conducted demonstrates the need to introduce pilot security audit programmes at the national level, potentially implemented through inter-agency cooperation. This would allow for early testing of legislative mechanisms, realistic assessment of time and resource requirements, and high-quality preparation and organisation of the first post-war elections.
Although none of the assessed hromadas passed the security audit with a 100% success rate, the identified shortcomings can be addressed prior to the start of the electoral process, provided that sufficient investment and adequate time for implementation are available.
This applies to the restoration of electoral infrastructure, energy facilities, continuation of demining efforts, construction of civil protection facilities, and strengthening human resources in critical sectors.
The identified risks confirm the need to approve security protocols for all participants in the electoral process, taking into account international standards and best practices. These protocols will also serve as an important prerequisite for the full deployment of international election observation missions.
Security audits demonstrate an urgent need for continued support to hromadas, including international assistance, aimed at strengthening their capacity and resilience.

Key findings

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🛡️The audit was conducted under the legal regime of martial law, which prohibits elections and referendums. If martial law were lifted, three out of eleven hromadas would have received positive assessments in the physical security domain: Pivdenne (Odesa Oblast), Kremenchuk (Poltava Oblast), and Kramatorsk (Donetsk Oblast). However, security conditions during wartime are inherently volatile and must be taken into account in decision-making.
⚠️ The main physical security challenges are shelling, the lack of shelters near polling station premises, and underdeveloped emergency alert systems. Among all surveyed hromadas, only Olevsk experienced no shelling during July–September 2025. No hromada has 100% of polling stations equipped with shelters within a 500-metre radius. In five hromadas, fewer than 50% of polling stations have shelters in case of security threats. In rural areas, the shelter situation is significantly worse than in urban areas, with some settlements lacking shelters within a 5–10 km radius. Rural settlements are also less well covered by alert systems. Air-raid alert systems cover less than 70% of the population in the Olevsk, Velyka Pysarivka, Snovsk, and Novomykolaivka hromadas.
🧑‍⚕️ Under the “Socio-Economic Development” block, positive audit results were recorded for the rear-area Olevsk and Pivdenne hromadas, as well as for Pervomaisk, which was under occupation from March to November 2022. The Novomykolaivka hromada, located near the combat zone, also passed this block due to relatively low shelling intensity. The hromada maintains an adequate level of service provision in education and healthcare, and the population has digital access (mobile communications, internet, radio and television broadcasting). However, attacks on Ukraine’s energy system in October–November 2025 caused blackouts lasting more than 12 consecutive hours in several hromadas, negatively affecting final assessments.
🗳️ Under the “Democratic Processes” indicators, positive assessments were received by the Kremenchuk and Pivdenne hromadas. The main obstacles for other hromadas included additional bans on peaceful assemblies imposed by local administrations (five hromadas), significant destruction of electoral infrastructure (four hromadas), and limited capacity to recruit precinct election commission members due to substantial population decline (five hromadas).
⚔️ Hromadas located in active combat zones and along the border with Russia (Nikopol, Snovsk, Kramatorsk, Velyka Pysarivka, Novomykolaivka, Kherson), as well as hromadas de-occupied in 2022 (Izium and Pervomaisk), demonstrate the weakest results across all audit blocks. The best results are observed in rear-area hromadas: Olevsk, Pivdenne, and Kremenchuk.
⚙️ Even in territories where hostilities are ongoing or have occurred (as defined by the list approved by the Ministry for Development), hromadas continue to function and provide basic services (education, healthcare, administrative services). Local self-government bodies and military administrations retain managerial capacity, indicating continued governability.
💥 Shelling intensity correlates with proximity to the front line. The highest levels were recorded in frontline hromadas: Kherson (3,861 incidents), Nikopol (1,220), and Kramatorsk (155). These hromadas also recorded the highest civilian casualties: 45 residents killed in Kherson between August and October 2025; 11 in Nikopol between July and September 2025; and 7 in Kramatorsk.
📉 De-occupied and frontline hromadas experienced population decline ranging from 50% to 75% of pre-war levels. Approximately 23–25% of residents remain in Kherson, less than 70% in Kramatorsk, 31% in Velyka Pysarivka, 44% in Pervomaisk, and about half of the population in Izium and Nikopol.
🏚️In eight hromadas, polling stations are partially destroyed, with the most extensive damage observed in combat-zone and de-occupied territories. In Nikopol, Izium, Velyka Pysarivka, and Pervomaisk, more than 50% of polling station premises are destroyed or damaged. Some hromadas are unable to assess the condition of electoral infrastructure due to ongoing hostilities, while others lack alternative premises to replace unfit polling stations.
📑 The operation of the State Voter Register in terms of interaction with voters has not been fully restored in all hromadas. In Kherson, all three voter register maintenance units are non-operational due to hostilities. Periodic updates of voters’ personal data do not occur at all in Kherson and only partially in Kramatorsk. Only three hromadas – Snovsk, Olevsk, and Pivdenne – reported no staffing or material resource problems in voter register maintenance units.
🚓 In seven out of eleven hromadas, police response times fall within recommended peacetime standards (7–10 minutes in urban areas and 20–40 minutes in rural areas): Snovsk, Olevsk, Pivdenne, Pervomaisk, Novomykolaivka, Kremenchuk, and Izium. In hromadas subject to regular intense shelling, response times may be delayed (Kherson) or not recorded at all (Kramatorsk and Velyka Pysarivka).
👮‍♂️ Police staffing levels across hromadas range from approximately 70% to 93%. Hromadas facing more frequent attacks tend to have lower staffing levels. For example, police staffing levels are 77.7% in Kramatorsk, 78% in Kherson, and 85% in Izium.
🚫 The largest mined areas are recorded in the Pervomaisk (9%) and Izium (7%) hromadas. Isolated mined areas are also documented in Novomykolaivka, Snovsk, Olevsk, Kramatorsk, and Pivdenne. No mined areas are recorded in the Kremenchuk hromada.
💣 Civilian mine-related incidents were recorded in the Kherson and Izium hromadas. In these hromadas, as well as in Nikopol and Velyka Pysarivka, the situation is further aggravated by the use of FPV drones against civilians and regular shelling.
🚑 In most hromadas, ambulance response times remain within peacetime standards (approximately 20 minutes), with the exception of Velyka Pysarivka, where response time reaches 49 minutes. Medical staffing levels generally range between 70% and 85%, allowing for the provision of basic healthcare services.
🚒 In 8 out of 11 hromadas, the response time of the State Emergency Service (SES) meets peacetime standards (up to 25 minutes): Snovsk, Olevsk, Pivdenne, Pervomaisk, Kremenchuk, Izium, Kherson, and Kramatorsk hromadas. However, in certain areas located in active combat zones, arrival times depend on the current security situation and may vary significantly. This is the case, for example, in the Velyka Pysarivka hromada. Data for the Nikopol and Novomykolaivka hromadas are unavailable, which prevents an assessment of the operational responsiveness of SES units.
⚖️ None of the 11 hromadas has been left without access to justice: courts continue to operate and take all possible measures to ensure citizens’ right to judicial protection. Air-raid alerts constitute a systemic obstacle to court operations: 10 out of 12 surveyed courts suspend hearings during alerts, while two continue proceedings by agreement of the parties. In the Nikopol and Kherson hromadas, justice is administered under conditions of regular intensive shelling. In three hromadas (Kramatorsk, Izium, and Velyka Pysarivka), territorial jurisdiction has been transferred to courts in other oblasts, which has reduced access to justice for residents.

Comparison of audited hromadas

This table allows for comparison of the security audit assessment matrices of the assessed hromadas.

📌 Mandatory criteries
(must be followed, at least partially)

📎 Optional criteries
(preferably to be followed)

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