

**HOW RUSSIAN
SHELLING
IN OCTOBER 2022
— JANUARY 2023
AFFECTED
THE MIGRATION
OF THE UKRAINIAN
POPULATION**

In October 2022, Russia started mass attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure. The Kremlin was issuing **ultimatums via Dmitriy Peskov**:¹ “The leadership of Ukraine has every opportunity to bring the situation [with the strikes on Ukrainian power facilities] back to normal, has every opportunity to **resolve the situation** in a way that **fulfils the demands** of the Russian side, and, accordingly, to **stop** all kinds of the **suffering of the local people**.”

The Russian army spared no resources — from October 1, 2022, to January 31, 2023, **more than 700 missiles of various types and more than 400 Shahed 131/136 drones** were fired at Ukraine, which caused serious damage to the electric power system. These attacks became one of the reasons² for the mass and often permanent migration of Ukrainians abroad in the fall and winter of 2022-2023 and for significant population movement within the country.

After the November 15³ and 23⁴ attacks, the number of departures abroad **increased by more than 60%** as compared to the previous days. An even greater **snowball effect** was recorded the **day after the missile strike**. On November 16 and 17, **more than 2.7 times** more people

1 <https://ria.ru/20221124/ukraina-1833940244.html>

2 <https://www.oporaua.org/viyna/kilkist-ukrayintsiv-ta-yikh-migratsiia-za-kor-don-cherez-viinu-doslidzhennia-gromadianskoyi-merezhi-opora-24791>

3 <https://t.me/kpszsus/2161>

4 <https://t.me/kpszsus/2171>

left Ukraine than on November 14, and the number of departures on November 24 exceeded the November 22 figure by **more than 3.5 times**.

Through missile attacks on all regions of Ukraine, the enemy wanted residents of regions far from the area of active hostilities also to seek refuge abroad.

Russian shelling had no less influence on internal migration. In particular, in October 2022, the Russians had **regular missile attacks on Zaporizhzhia**: there were 17 victims on October 6,⁵ 19 — on October 9,⁶ and 8 — on October 10.⁷ When comparing these tragic events with the statistics of departures from Zaporizhzhia and the Zaporizhzhia region, it can be stated that almost a **quarter of all departures** to other regions registered in four months was during **just (!) one week** — on October 6–12, 2022.

In this study, we analyzed Ukrainians' migration trends and scale following the Russian shelling in the joint study by Civil Network OPORA,⁸ International Center for Ukrainian Victory,⁹ and Vodafone Ukraine¹⁰ telecommunications company. The data for the calculations was provided by the Vodafone mobile operator.

The data presented in this report proves that the strategic objective of the Russian Federation is to depopulate Ukrainian territories to counter resistance.

5 <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-zaporizhzhua-udar-zhertvy/32070979.html>

6 <https://suspilne.media/589651-ce-buv-apokalipsis-vogon-kriki-sireni-u-zaporizzi-vsanuvali-pamat-zagiblih-vnaslidok-raketnogo-udaru-rf/>

7 https://24tv.ua/raketniy-teror-zaporizhhi-vidomo-pro-1-zagiblogo-postrazhdalih_n2174594

8 <https://www.oporaua.org/>

9 <https://ukrainianvictory.org/>




10 <https://www.vodafone.ua/>

Moreover, the analysis of deliberate Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure is the priority case of the investigators from the International Criminal Court (ICC) along with the forced deportation of Ukrainian children. This is proved by the statement¹¹ of Karim Khan, ICC prosecutor, dated March 7, 2023. It is also known¹² that on June 1, 2023, Dutch and Czech investigators completed their ICC mission to Ukraine to collect evidence of critical and civilian infrastructure damages.

- 11 <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-prosecutor-karim-khan-kc-concludes-fourth-visit-ukraine-amidst-darkness-light-justice>
- 12 <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/dutch-war-crimes-investigators-examine-ukraines-battered-infrastructure-2023-06-01/>

MIGRATION ABROAD

Mass Russian attacks on the energy infrastructure made residents of Ukraine migrate abroad. In November 2022, the number of departures abroad **increased by 17%** as compared to October, and in December — **by as much as 39%**. Even in January 2023, when the power supply situation slightly improved, there were **by 24% more** departures from Ukraine than in October.

MONTH	INCREASE AS COMPARED TO OCTOBER 2022
November 2022	17,7% 
December 2022	39,5% 
January 2023	24,4% 

There is a relation between Russian shelling and the departure of Ukrainians abroad. Here are a few examples.

On November 15, 2022, the fourth Russian mass attack on energy infrastructure took place, when 96 missiles were launched.¹³ Then the number of departures **increased by 60%** compared to the previous day,

¹³ <http://t.me/kpszsus/2161>


November 14, and on the following two days, **2.7 times more people went abroad** than on the day before the shelling. By the way, on November 17, the shelling continued.¹⁴

An even greater increase was recorded following the fifth massive missile attack on November 23, 2022, when 70 missiles were launched.¹⁵ The same day, **63% more people went abroad** than the day before the shelling. And the very next day, November 24, **more than 3.5 times more people left Ukraine than on November 22.**

There were quite a few cases of peak departures, but from the second half of November 2022, they became quite distinctive.

RUSSIAN SHELLING FORCED UKRAINIANS TO DEPART ABROAD

Following the massive attacks on November 15 and 24, a record number of departures abroad was recorded.



In general, dozens of cases when the number of departures abroad following the Russian shelling increased as compared to the previous day were recorded. **Examples from regions that are far from the area of active hostilities** are presented below:

¹⁴ <https://suspilne.media/318504-pidsumki-somogo-ramstajnu-ukraina-vimagae-dos-tupu-do-misca-padinna-raketi-u-polsi-267-den-vijni-onlajn/>

¹⁵ <https://t.me/kpszsu/2171>

On October 10, 2022, **52% more people** departed abroad from the Zhytomyr region than the previous day. On the morning of October 10, the Russian Federation attacked¹⁶ the energy infrastructure, which caused a power cut in part of the region. A similar migration increase from the Zhytomyr region was recorded on the day and the day after the Russian missile attacks on November 15, 2022,¹⁷ and December 16, 2022.¹⁸

On October 22, 2022, the Kremlin attacked¹⁹ energy facilities in Lutsk and Kovel, which caused water and power cuts in some districts of these cities. On the same day, **33% more people** departed from the Volyn region abroad than on the day before the shelling.

On December 29, 2022, Russia launched²⁰ missiles at Lviv. As a result, one person died and another 15 were injured. On the same day, 43% more people from the Lviv region left Ukraine than on December 27 or 28.

It should be noted it was **the economically active population that left the country**: more than 69% were employed, and 11% were self-employed.

Moreover, more than half of all persons departed abroad were the residents of only four regions: Chernivtsi — 18.8% of all, Zakarpattia — 17.5%, Odesa — 12.7%, and Lviv — 10%. The least active were residents of the Mykolaiv, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Donetsk, and Kherson regions. Therefore, the residents **of regions bordering the EU and Moldova were significantly more mobile**.

16 <https://suspilne.media/291712-zvuki-vibuhiv-u-zitomiri-so-vidomo-2/>

17 <https://suspilne.media/317364-vnaslidok-raketnogo-obstrilu-zitomir-lisivsa-bez-svitla-so-vidomo/>


18 <https://suspilne.media/339982-vnaslidok-raketnoi-ataki-poskodzena-energeticna-infrastruktura-zitomirsini-energetiki/>

19 <https://suspilne.media/300482-u-lucku-vnaslidok-vibuhiv-nemae-svitla-ta-vodi/>

20 <https://suspilne.media/650024-raketnij-obstril-lvova-29-grudna-prokuratura-vidkrila-kriminalne-provadzenna/>

ACTIVITY OF UKRAINIANS DEPARTING ABROAD














Residents of regions bordering the EU and Moldova were significantly more mobile.
The study period: from October 1, 2022 to January 31, 2023.



For residents of 15 out of 24 studied regions, Poland became the main country of destination.

Data on the number of active Vodafone SIM cards abroad also confirms the increase in the number of people going abroad following intensified Russian shelling and blackouts. After calculating the monthly median values for the period of October 1, 2022, to April 30, 2023, we noted a gradual increase in the number of active subscribers abroad. In particular, in December 2022 and in January 2023, there were 10% (60 thousand subscribers) more than in October 2022.

Given the average percentage of the Vodafone mobile operator coverage in Ukraine, it can be assumed that in December 2022 – January 2023 as compared to October 2022, **a general approximate increase in the number of subscribers of all Ukrainian operators abroad was 130–150 thousand.**

MONTH	MEDIAN NUMBER OF ACTIVE VODAFONE SIM CARDS	INCREASE AS COMPARED TO OCTOBER 2022
October 2022	622 K 	
November 2022	633 K 	1,7% 
December 2022	678 K 	9% 
January 2023	684 K 	10% 
February 2023	658 K 	5,8% 
March 2023	654 K 	5,1% 
April 2023	651 K 	4,7% 

On average, the countries with the largest number of active Vodafone subscribers were Germany — 23.1% of the total number, Poland — 16.3%, and the Czech Republic — 10.1%.

As of January 2023, the top 20 countries with the most active Vodafone subscribers and the **largest percentage increase** as compared to October 2022 were Romania — 90%, the USA — 53%, Slovakia — 27%, Ireland — 25%, Norway — 23%, and Germany — 15%.


On the contrary, the number of subscribers in the neighboring Romania, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary decreased in the following months. Probably, some Ukrainians who stayed in these states returned home. They could also change their SIM card or move to another country — for example, in spring 2023, the number of active subscribers in Germany, Norway, and the Netherlands was growing. Data by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) proves²¹ a similar trend of Ukrainian immigrants moving to Germany.

21 <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>

INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE VODAFONE SIM CARDS ABROAD AS COMPARED TO OCTOBER 2022

The countries are given the descending median value of the subscribers' number for the entire period of the study.

GERMANY	4.2%	8.4%	15.5%	11.7%	19.0%	18.8%
POLAND	-1.1%	8.0%	8.7%	2.3%	0.5%	1.1%
CZECH REPUBLIC	0.5%	3.3%	2.8%	2.8%	1.3%	-0.7%
ROMANIA	19.2%	82.2%	89.9%	49.6%	44.2%	35.8%
NETHERLANDS	5.0%	9.0%	9.4%	14.6%	16.6%	19.5%
ITALY	-3.4%	-4.3%	-5.6%	-9.4%	-31.5%	-33.2%
HUNGARY	0.5%	7.2%	5.7%	-3.1%	-6.7%	-6.4%
FRANCE	-1.7%	0.7%	-0.5%	0.8%	2.0%	0.9%
SPAIN	0.2%	3.1%	1.8%	-1.8%	0.3%	-1.4%
UNITED KINGDOM	3.4%	2.1%	-2.1%	0.1%	5.6%	-3.8%
SLOVAKIA	9.6%	22.0%	27.1%	15.3%	13.7%	19.8%
AUSTRIA	-0.3%	9.1%	10.9%	4.6%	1.4%	-1.3%
BULGARIA	-3.7%	-6.5%	-12.3%	-14.8%	-15.7%	-17.4%
IRELAND	10.1%	21.3%	25.8%	31.8%	-3.5%	17.1%
BELGIUM	0.9%	4.5%	5.3%	8.4%	7.3%	6.5%
LITHUANIA	-0.6%	3.9%	-2.1%	-5.2%	-4.4%	-8.1%
USA	2.4%	18.1%	53.3%	57.2%	53.0%	52.0%
CANADA	11.9%	29.7%	10.3%	3.2%	9.9%	13.2%
PORTUGAL	1.9%	3.4%	7.1%	4.5%	5.3%	2.4%
NORWAY	8.8%	19.7%	22.8%	33.3%	44.5%	50.6%
	Nov 2022	Dec 2022	Jan 2023	Feb 2023	Mar 2023	Apr 2023



INTERNAL MIGRATION

Russian shelling also affected internal migration in Ukraine. A lot of people were forced to move due to active hostilities, **a complicated situation in the energy sector, or targeted missile and artillery strikes** on residential buildings and infrastructure facilities. A better situation with power supply in certain regions or their geographical distance from the Russian Federation contributed to the fact that Ukrainians **could consider them a safer option.**

In particular, many regions (Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kherson, and Mykolaiv) are within the potential impact zone of the Russian S-300 air missile systems. These systems are designed for air defence, but they can also be used to **deliver low-precision strikes** with certain types of surface-to-air missiles **at ground targets.** Russia uses²² this capability to terrorize Ukrainian cities. The attacks by other weapons, like the Iskander-M army tactical missile system and Kh-22 missiles, which then could not be intercepted by the Ukrainian air defence, should also be counted.

Therefore, from October 1, 2022, to January 31, 2023, almost **7.8 million** departures from the area of residence lasting 5 days or more were recorded. Excluding travels within the same region, there were **5.1 million** such departures. Only about **34% of these travels** lasting 5 or more days **were within the region of residence** — Ukrainians were quite mobile.

²² <https://chas.news/current/s-300-s-400-yak-rosiya-obstrilyue-ukrainski-mista-z-kompleksiv-ppo>

Ukrainians travelled most actively in October 2022 — 29% of the total number of trips. November 2022 accounted for 24% of them, December — 25%, and January 2023 — only 22%. The busiest travelling day was December 31, 2022 — New Year's Eve (and the day²³ of another Russian attack using more than 20 missiles²⁴) — accounting for almost 203,000 departures.

In turn, more than 1 million departures were recorded in the first decade of October 2022. This period was marked by increased²⁵ nuclear blackmail,²⁶ the intensification of attacks²⁷ using Shahed 131/136 UAVs and S-300²⁸ air missile systems, as well as the mass (more than 80) missile attack²⁹ on the entire territory of Ukraine on October 10.

Travels lasting 5 days or more were also caused by blackouts following the continuous destruction of Ukraine's energy infrastructure.

23 <https://fakty.com.ua/ua/proisshestvija/20221231-raketni-udary-u-kyjevi-mykolajevi-zaporizhzi-hmelnyczkomu-shho-vidomo-pro-ataku-rf-po-ukrayini-pered-novym-rokom/>

24 <https://t.me/CinCAFU/339>

25 <https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2022/10/3/7370170/>

26 <https://suspilne.media/288373-ak-ratuvatisa-vid-brudnoi-bombi-adernoi-zbroi-ci-avarii-na-aes-instrukcia/>


27 <https://suspilne.media/288997-ak-uberegis-v-razi-ataki-iranskih-droniv-kamikadze-po-radi-centru-strategicnih-komunikacij/>

28 <https://suspilne.media/290700-nicnij-raketnij-obstril-harkova-naslidki-vlucanna-v-salivskomu-ta-osnovanskomu-rajonah-mista/>

29 <https://suspilne.media/291732-rosijski-raketni-obstrili-ukraini-10-zovtna-so-vidomo/>

BY UKRAINIANS WHO WERE NOT REGISTERED AT HOME LAST MONTH

Ukrainians mostly traveled in the first decade of October 2022 and before the New Year.



In October 2022, the Russian attacks on³⁰ Zaporizhzhia were particularly severe. According to³¹ Oleksandr Starukh, the head of the regional military administration, more than 70 city residents were killed as a result of Russian attacks in less than two weeks, from September 30 to October 12. The bloodiest attacks happened on September 30³² — 32 victims, October 6³³ — 17 victims, October 9³⁴ — 19 victims, and October 10³⁵ — 8 victims.

When comparing these tragic events with the statistics of departures from Zaporizhzhia and the Zaporizhzhia region, it can be stated that almost a **quarter of all departures** to other regions lasting more than 5 days registered in four months was during **just (!) one week** — on October 6–12, 2022. This is almost 60 thousand travels.

30 <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/raketniy-teror-zaporyzhzhya/32060002.html>

31 <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-zaporizhzhya-zhertvy-obstrily/32079246.html>

32 <https://24tv.ua/obstril-zaporizhzhya-sogodni-skilki-lyudey-zaginulo-cherez-raketniy-n2168534>


33 <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-zaporizhzhua-udar-zhertvy/32070979.html>

34 <https://suspilne.media/589651-ce-buv-apokalipsis-vogon-kriki-sireni-u-zaporizzi-vsa-nuvali-pamat-zagiblih-vnaslidok-raketnogo-udaru-rf/>

35 <https://24tv.ua/raketniy-teror-zaporizhzhhi-vidomo-pro-l-zagiblogo-postrazhdalih-n2174594>

IN OCTOBER 2022, THE RESIDENTS OF ZAPORIZHZHIA AND ZAPORIZHZHIA REGION LITERALLY FLEE FROM RUSSIAN MISSILE ATTACKS

A quarter of all departures for the 4 months was in just (!) one week – on October 6–12. From September 30 to October 10, more than 70 residents of the region died following the Kremlin attacks.



November 30, 2022, **became a record day** with the largest number of departures recorded during the studied period in the **Cherkasy region**. Excluding intra-regional travels, more than 7,500 trips were recorded on this day — **a three-fold increase** compared to the previous day. Residents of the Cherkasy region went to the Kirovohrad and Kyiv regions, and Kyiv city. As of the morning of November 30, more than 300,000 households in the region experienced power cuts,³⁶ and “red” outage schedules were in force³⁷ — alternating 4 hours without electricity and only 2 hours with it.

³⁶ <https://suspilne.media/328374-na-cerkasini-znestrumleno-300-659-spoziva-civ-ak-podaut-elektriku-poasnili-v-oblennero/>

³⁷ <https://suspilne.media/328166-akij-grafik-vidklucen-elektroenergii-zastosovuut-na-cerkasini-30-listopada/>

REGIONAL MIGRATION BALANCE

In general, 14 regions of Ukraine were characterized by a positive migration balance — more people arrived than departed there. In absolute terms (with the “+” sign), the highest balance was in the Lviv region — 340 thousand, Kyiv — 156 thousand, Transcarpathia — 112 thousand, and Volyn — 83 thousand.

The Donetsk and Kharkiv regions were also among the leaders, but their positions in the ranking and numerical indicators were not relevant as active hostilities in these regions caused significant movements of the military men.


However, the balance was negative for 10 regions of Ukraine. These were not only the south regions — Zaporizhzhia or Mykolaiv region — but also the west (Rivne, Ternopil regions) and the center of the country (Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi regions).

In general, excluding Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions, characterized by current active hostilities since 2022, which may distort the data of the civilian population migration, the **“most attractive”** regions of destination were **Zakarpattia, Lviv, Volyn, and Chernivtsi**.

The popularity of these regions is probably caused by their distance from the area of active hostilities. Moreover, these regions are close to the border³⁸ and have³⁹ a significant number of active checkpoints to cross the state border, so they could potentially be perceived as a “transitional place of residence” if Russian shelling intensified and the energy situation worsened.

³⁸ <https://dpsu.gov.ua/ua/map>


³⁹ <https://dpsu.gov.ua/ua/map>





REGIONAL MIGRATION BALANCE

Zakarpattia, Lviv, Volyn, and Chernivtsi regions were “attractive” for migration as they were far from the area of active hostilities. The study period: from October 1, 2022 to January 31, 2023.





RETURN ACTIVITY

Another study subject was the **Ukrainians' activity on returning home**. It concerns subscribers who were not in the region of their residence last month, and the next month were registered at home at least 5 times a month.

In spring 2023, quite more subscribers returned home. In particular, March 2023 accounted for 20.4% of all returns, and April 2023 — 20.8%.

However, the study of the Ukrainians' motivation to return requires more thorough sociological research as it can be related not only to the Russian shelling dynamics.


MONTH	NUMBER OF RETURNS		SHARE OF THE TOTAL	
October 2022	73 K	<div></div>	4,8%	<div></div>
November 2022	171 K	<div></div>	11,3%	<div></div>
December 2022	231 K	<div></div>	15,3%	<div></div>
January 2023	211 K	<div></div>	14%	<div></div>
February 2023	203 K	<div></div>	13,4%	<div></div>
March 2023	308 K	<div></div>	20,4%	<div></div>
April 2023	314 K	<div></div>	20,8%	<div></div>

The **high negative correlation coefficient (-0.74)** between the number of returnees and the number of missiles launched by Russia during mass attacks should also be noted: the fewer missiles were launched on the territory of Ukraine, the more returns were recorded. And while correlation does not mean cause-effect relation, in March and April 2023, the number of returns increased by more than 50%.



ACTIVITY OF RETURNS TO THE REGION OF RESIDENCE

By Ukrainians who were not registered at home last month



METHODOLOGY

The study covered travels around Ukraine and abroad in the period from October 1, 2022, to January 31, 2023, inclusive, and returns in the period from October 1, 2022, to April 30, 2023. The data for the calculations was provided by the **Vodafone Ukraine** mobile operator.

The **travel** means the subscriber's departure from their place of residence for 5 days or more. Departure data are calculated by months, therefore, one subscriber could travel several times during this period. The **region of destination** is the location where the subscriber started his/her day during the mentioned 5-day period more often.

If the subscriber was not in the region of his/her residence the previous month, and the following month was at home at least 5 times, it was calculated as the **return activity**. Calculations were also made by months; therefore, one subscriber could return several times.

The **date of departure abroad** is the time when the subscriber first was on the territory of Ukraine for one day and then was registered in roaming service abroad. The country of destination is the country where the subscriber spent most days of the studied month.

The study of travels and returns was conducted by **gender and social status**: employed, self-employed, retired, student, schoolboy/girl, other, and unknown.

To calculate data on travels and returns around Ukraine, as well as departures abroad, the **hypothesis** that the behavior of other mobile operator subscribers is similar to that of Vodafone Ukraine ones was applied.

To calculate the absolute values within each region, the average Vodafone Ukraine **coverage coefficient** (a mobile operator coverage of the territory of a certain region) and the indicator of the number of SIM cards per capita in each region were used. These calculations within one region can be **presented by the formula**:

$$\text{VODAFONE DATA} \times \frac{(1 \div \text{COVERAGE COEFFICIENT})}{\text{SIM CARDS NUMBER-PER CAPITA}}$$

The approach in question could affect the accuracy of absolute numerical values.

It should be noted that to **determine the number of active subscribers abroad**, only the data from the Vodafone Ukraine operator was used without any additional modelling.

LEGAL COMMENT

While cynically claiming⁴⁰ a “heartly and respectful attitude towards the Ukrainian people”, dictator Vladimir Putin and the tens of millions of Russians supporting him do wish to eliminate Ukraine as a state. The data presented above prove that the strategic objective of the Russian Federation is to depopulate Ukrainian territories to counter resistance.

The ultimatum-like rhetoric⁴¹ of Russian officials and deliberate attacks on civilian infrastructure, in particular, water supply systems, power plants, and gas pipelines, which are located far from the area of hostilities and are not legitimate military targets, are a result that the Russian Federation led aggressive actions since 2014 with impunity.

However, nowadays, there is an opportunity to restore justice and make perpetrators accountable. Courts with international jurisdiction, particularly the International Criminal Court (ICC), play an important role in this process. The analysis of deliberate attacks on civilian infrastructure is the priority of the ICC along with the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. This is proved by the statement of Karim Khan, ICC prosecutor, dated March 7, 2023.⁴² It also became known that on June 1, 2023,⁴³ Dutch and Czech investigators completed their

40 <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69781>

41 <https://ria.ru/20221124/ukraina-1833940244.html>

42 <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-prosecutor-karim-khan-kc-concludes-fourth-visit-ukraine-amidst-darkness-light-justice>

43 <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/dutch-war-crimes-investigators-examine-ukraines-battered-infrastructure-2023-06-01/>

6-week ICC mission to Ukraine to collect evidence of critical and civilian infrastructure damages.

It should be remembered that, according to Art. 8(2)(b) of the Rome Statute,⁴⁴ intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking a direct part in the hostilities, or intentionally directing attacks against civilian facilities, that is, facilities that are not military ones, are recognized as war crimes.

At the same time, the deliberate creation of living conditions designed to complete or partial physical destruction of a group through systemic damage to critical civilian infrastructure may have the characteristics of the crime of genocide (cl. of Article 6 of the Rome Statute; cl. of Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide).

Given that the ICC has not yet issued any arrest warrants for suspects in these categories of international crimes, our report can help international investigative bodies to understand better the context of events, the cause-and-effect relations, and the impact of Russian aggression on the civilians and its strategic purpose and, therefore, to speed up the investigation of strategic cases regarding Ukraine, and bring the perpetrators to justice sooner.

44 https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_588#n69

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Civil Network OPORA is one of the leading Ukrainian non-governmental organizations working on public control and advocacy in the fields of elections, parliamentary government, education, local self-government, countering disinformation, as well as the comprehensive implementation of the open data principle.

Following the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, the organization's activists began to monitor hate speech, events, statements, and decisions made on the territory of the Russian Federation having a direct impact on Ukraine. OPORA also works to ensure that Ukraine can legally transition to a civilian system of governance, and restore and reform all democratic institutions after the war.

Website: oporaua.org

International Center for Ukrainian Victory is a public diplomacy platform for victory founded in Warsaw by Ukrainian civil society activists to encourage opinion leaders around the world to support Ukraine.

The Center's objective is to mobilize the world for Ukrainian victory. Its experts deal with the following areas: weapons supply to Ukraine, special tribunal establishment and punishing Russia for war crimes; combating nuclear terrorism and preserving Ukraine's energy system; seizure of Russian assets; strengthening sanctions against Russia; and acceleration of the European integration of Ukraine.

Website: ukrainianvictory.org

Vodafone Ukraine is one of the leading Ukrainian telecommunications companies that provides 3G and 4G high-speed Internet, mobile communication, and Internet services. As one of the technological leaders, the company actively develops new tech services — Internet of Things (IoT), technologies and solutions for Smart City, big data analytics, fin-tech, and cloud services.

15.8 million customers use Vodafone services in Ukraine. The company is part of NEQSOL Holding.

Website: vodafone.ua